
Hunting hidden MiddleBox

In Fiber, no one can hear your scream

nous@le_carlie:~# nmap -O -v darcosion.local



- ➤ **Darcosion**, darcommuniste, dargrosion, « darco » for my friends
- Work at SERMA
- Do a lot of OSINT in OSINT-FR (the frens)
- ➤ Love networks ©
- ➤ Do know how to do network 🖾 👃

> LOVE TRACEROUTES






The famous traceroute

- Work with TTL (Time To Live)
 - > TTL decrementing at every « IP hop »
 - ➤ When it's 0, packet dropped and packet ICMP TIME_EXCEEDED returned
- For traceroute, we start with TTL at 0, increment and it end like that :

```
SG350X#traceroute ip software.cisco.com ttl 20
Tracing the route to software.cisco.com (184.26.111.212) from , 20 hops
max, 18 byte packets
Type Esc to abort.
 1 192.168.100.1 (192.168.100.1) <10 ms <10 ms
 2 124.6.177.113 (124.6.177.113) <20 ms <10 ms <20 ms
 3 124.6.149.117 (124.6.149.117) <20 ms <30 ms <30 ms
 4 120.28.0.61 (120.28.0.61) <20 ms <20 ms <30 ms
 5 120.28.10.101 (120.28.10.101) <40 ms <30 ms <30 ms
   120.28.9.158 (120.28.9.158) <40 ms <40 ms
   63.218.2.189 (63.218.2.189) <50 ms <50 ms
   63.223.17.162 (63.223.17.162) <60 ms <50 ms <50 ms
   63.223.17.162 (63.223.17.162) <50 ms <50 ms <50 ms
12 213.254.227.77 (213.254.227.77) <50 ms <60 ms <50 ms
14 184.26.111.212 (184.26.111.212) <190 ms <200 ms <200 ms
Trace complete.
SG350X#
```

The network




- Many actor
- ➤ ISP, private provider, fiber company...

But what is a middlebox?


- > Technologie of packet manipulation/interception
- ➤ Could be load balancers, firewalls, NAT, WAN optimizator, TLG/ALG, NAT-PT, socks/proxies, WAF, gatekeepers, CDN, ...
- > Often visible on network

Famous example of middlebox problem: TLS 1.3 protocol forced to change specification because of traffic dropped by middlebox


> A simple example : Google Load Balancing



> A big example : the great firewall




> A weird example : Pakistan Telecom DPI ?




➤ Detection by « fuzzing » traceroute

Just an example :

Paris Traceroute model



Header variation



- Using ICMP tricks for seeing MPLS
 - Featuring RFC4950 (just traceroute with « -e »!)
 - Enable the view of MPLS material/configuration
 - ➤ Usefull on company pentest/red team

```
@:~$ traceroute -e 118.88.16.0
traceroute to 118.88.16.0 (118.88.16.0), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
1 bbox.lan (192.168.1.254) 5.443 ms 5.307 ms 5.231 ms
   <redacted> (<redacted>) 12.175 ms 12.107 ms 12.042 ms
4 212.194.171.69 (212.194.171.69) <MPLS:L=29007,E=0,S=1,T=1> 14.078 ms 14.003 ms 13.903 ms
   be1.cbr01-cro.net.bbox.fr (212.194.171.0) <MPLS:L=29007,E=0,S=1,T=1> 13.860 ms 13.757 ms 13.672 ms
   ae7-203.RT.THV.PAR.FR.retn.net (87.245.246.250) 11.879 ms 7.626 ms 7.606 ms
  ae6-6.RT1.INT.STV.RU.retn.net (87.245.233.94) 60.209 ms 60.979 ms 60.940 ms
   GW-Intal.retn.net (87.245.238.13) 98.965 ms 98.951 ms 98.937 ms
  195.69.189.48 (195.69.189.48) 98.889 ms 98.703 ms 102.551 ms
  195.69.189.32 (195.69.189.32) 102.539 ms 97.953 ms 99.147 ms
```

Comparing IPv4 and IPv6

```
traceroute to 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1 gateway (51.178.44.1) 0.403 ms 0.412 ms 0.402 ms
 2 192.168.143.254 (192.168.143.254) 0.392 ms 0.382 ms 0.372 ms
 3 10.69.88.190 (10.69.88.190) 0.361 ms 0.349 ms 0.329 ms
 4 10.69.86.14 (10.69.86.14) 0.309 ms 0.324 ms 0.309 ms
 5 10.69.64.18 (10.69.64.18) 0.334 ms 10.69.64.20 (10.69.64.20) 0.282 ms 10.69.64.22 (10.69.64.22) 0.352 ms
 6 10.17.193.110 (10.17.193.110) 0.440 ms 0.413 ms 10.17.200.10 (10.17.200.10) 0.269 ms
 7 10.73.8.114 (10.73.8.114) 0.186 ms 10.73.9.10 (10.73.9.10) 0.180 ms 10.73.9.74 (10.73.9.74) 0.167 ms
 8 10.95.48.10 (10.95.48.10) 0.668 ms 0.700 ms 0.698 ms
 9 be105.fra-fr5-sbb2-nc5.de.eu (91.121.215.197) 3.347 ms 3.325 ms *
10 10.200.0.17 (10.200.0.17) 3.043 ms 10.200.0.19 (10.200.0.19) 3.103 ms 3.127 ms
11 * * *
12 * * *
13 dns.google (8.8.8.8) 3.092 ms 3.108 ms 3.090 ms
:~# sudo traceroute -6 2001:4860:4860::8888 -e
traceroute to 2001:4860:4860::8888 (2001:4860:4860::8888), 30 hops max, 80 byte packets
 1 gateway (2001:41d0:404:200::1) 1.423 ms 1.477 ms 0.803 ms
 2 fd00::ffe (fd00::ffe) 1.585 ms 1.575 ms 1.558 ms
 3 2001:41d0:0:1:3::c27f (2001:41d0:0:1:3::c27f) 1.557 ms 1.613 ms 1.555 ms
 4 2001:41d0:0:1:3::c1c6 (2001:41d0:0:1:3::c1c6) 1.590 ms 1.486 ms 1.473 ms
 5 2001:41d0:0:1:3::c010 (2001:41d0:0:1:3::c010) 1.461 ms 1.621 ms 2001:41d0:0:1:3::c00e (2001:41d0:0:1:3::c00e) 1.5
 6 2001:41d0:0:50::1:c80c (2001:41d0:0:50::1:c80c) 1.932 ms 2001:41d0:0:50::1:c13c (2001:41d0:0:50::1:c13c) 1.192 ms
 7 2001:41d0:0:50::5:93a (2001:41d0:0:50::5:93a) 0.290 ms 2001:41d0:0:50::5:838 (2001:41d0:0:50::5:838) 0.274 ms 2009
 8 * be100-100.sbg-g2-nc5.fr.eu (2001:41d0::442) 0.954 ms *
   be105.fra-fr5-sbb2-nc5.de.eu (2001:41d0::44b) 3.427 ms * 3.292 ms
11 googel.as15169.de.eu (2001:41d0::2671) 3.151 ms 3.148 ms 3.142 ms
12 * 2a00:1450:8154::1 (2a00:1450:8154::1) 2.957 ms 2a00:1450:8153::1 (2a00:1450:8153::1) 2.977 ms
13 dns.google (2001:4860:4860::8888) 2.979 ms 3.039 ms 2.887 ms
```

> Never forget: the TTL is your best friend



Less classical middlebox

- Visible DPI (« Deep Packet Inspection »)
- > Active Censorship Firewall (Great Firewall, maybe Eagle, ...)
- > Firewall used as censorship equipment (SonicWall, Fortiweb, ...)
- BGP « optimizator » (used as anti-DDOS and BGP protection).
- Many other!:D

Tips to find less classical middlebox

- > Fuzzing everywhere! Hoping to see abnormal trafic management
 - > Fuzzing with IP packet fragmentation
 - Cryptography! (playing with tls/ssh/kerberos sessions)
 - ➤ You can do that easily with « fuzz() » function on scapy!
- Play with censorship rules
 - > Try domains list as SNI on TLS packet, HTTP packet, DNS query...
- Search for abnormal process time
 - maybe your packets aren't just routed ? (¬_¬)
 - > Inconsistency of TCP stream, or on UDP encrypted stream
- > Try weird protocols
 - > Torrents, darknets, old protocols... Endless possibility!

Why searching middlebox?

For fun and profit!

Discovering new equipment, understand how network actually work, understand policy on network (censorship, « QoS », security policies, ...)

Why searching middlebox?

➤ For profit ?

➤ Hiding on pentest, try to discovery hidden equipement on pentest session, understand security policy or investigate shadow network equipments

Questions?

Don't be shy like middleboxes ©

References

- https://www.bortzmeyer.org/search?pattern=middleboxe
- « ICMP Extensions for Multiprotocol Label Switching » https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4950.html
- « traceroute(8) Linux man page » https://linux.die.net/man/8/traceroute
- «IAB Workshop on Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet (SEMI) Report » https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7663.html
- « Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues » https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3234
- « Weaponizing Middleboxes for TCP Reflected amplification » https://geneva.cs.umd.edu/papers/usenix-weaponizing-ddos.pdf